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ABSTRACT
In recent years, several mobile applications allowed individ-
uals to anonymously share information with friends and con-
tacts, without any persistent identity marker. The functions of
these “tie-based” anonymity services may be notably differ-
ent than other social media services. We use semi-structured
interviews to qualitatively examine motivations, practices and
perceptions in two tie-based anonymity apps: Secret (now de-
funct, in the US) and Mimi (in China). Among the findings,
we show that: (1) while users are more comfortable in self-
disclosure, they still have specific practices and strategies to
avoid or allow identification; (2) attempts for de-identification
of others are prevalent and often elaborate; and (3) partici-
pants come to expect both negativity and support in response
to posts. Our findings highlight unique opportunities and po-
tential benefits for tie-based anonymity apps, including serv-
ing disclosure needs and social probing. Still, challenges for
making such applications successful, for example the preva-
lence of negativity and bullying, are substantial.
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INTRODUCTION
From masquerade balls to online forums and popular systems
like Reddit and 4chan, the design of anonymity functions has
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affected social interactions and dynamics in offline and on-
line environments [11, 27]. Anonymity allows people to feel
less constrained by the expectations of their everyday iden-
tities [3, 25], which in turn allows more candid and honest
self-expressions [1, 43]. Anonymity also leads users to dis-
close more information [52], which may result in positive
emotional outcomes for the person disclosing [45]. On the
other hand, the lack of attribution and responsibility in anony-
mous environments can encourage malicious behaviors such
as trolling [33] and cyberbullying [5, 6, 34]. It is no wonder
that society in general, and HCI researchers in particular, have
been fascinated with the topic of anonymity.
While early Internet platforms traditionally defaulted to
anonymity or pseudonymity, the last decade has witnessed
a “real-name”, complete-identity push by some social me-
dia platforms like Facebook, Google+, and LinkedIn. Over
the last few years, though, a number of new systems have
emerged that adopt a new model of anonymity that we call
relation-based anonymity. These applications often build on
mobile device affordances such as persistent user identifica-
tion and metadata such as location, as well as information
about one’s social ties through linkage to real-name social
media platforms.
Most notably, relation-based anonymous applications such as
Secret, Mimi, Whisper, Rumr and Yik Yak all provide mobile
services to anonymously share content with people related to
them, for example by physical proximity (proximity-based)
or social affinity (tie-based) [37]. Secret, now defunct, was a
tie-based mobile application when first launched in 2013: it
allowed users to “share with friends, anonymously”. Yik Yak,
on the other hand, adopted the proximity-based model that
allows users to see anonymous posts within a 10-mile radius
or within a given university campus. Notably, in all these
services, individual posts by the same contributor cannot be
linked to each other1. The combination of relationship and
1In March 2016 (two years after launch), Yik Yak introduced
“handles”—permanent pseudonyms that users can choose to post
with.
lack of persistent identity resulted in this new and interesting
model of anonymity, and presents a wide set of new research
questions within HCI.
While HCI research has extensively studied the topic of
anonymity, we here extend that literature by providing a
qualitative examination of tie-based anonymous applications.
Past HCI research includes broad examinations of anonymity
perceptions and practices across multiple services and sys-
tems (e.g., [28, 44]), as well as studies of anonymity on
specific platforms [29]. In the latter category, HCI re-
search has examined various platforms, including for in-
stance anonymity on social media [12, 28]; fully anonymous
persistent-identity topic-based forums [26, 40, 47, 59]; com-
munity ad-hoc discussion threads [1, 30, 31, 35]; proximity-
based anonymity services [29]; platforms that allow selective
anonymity such as Ask.fm [18]; and anonymity in open col-
laboration projects such as Wikipedia [20]. Most of these
platforms feature anonymity models significantly different
from our model of interest here, likely resulting in differ-
ent dynamics and affordances than tie-based anonymity ser-
vices. The fact that contributors are aware that their readers
are within their friend (and friend-of-friend) circle, provides a
different foundation than, for example, pseudononymous so-
cial media.
To explore people’s practices and perceptions around this new
anonymity model, we posed the following research questions:
RQ1. What type of interactions do tie-based anonymous so-
cial networks afford according to regular users?
RQ2. What benefits and affordances do users of tie-based
anonymous social networks experience?
RQ3. What are the perceived drawbacks and negative expe-
riences by users of tie-based anonymous social networks?
To this end, we conducted a qualitative interview study with
users of two apps: the US-based (and now defunct) Secret,
and the China-based Mimi (now known as Wumii2). We con-
ducted semi-structured interviews with users of these applica-
tions, and followed up with interviewees seven months later,
after a period of significant change in both apps. In particu-
lar, during that period, Secret had changed from a tie-based
to a proximity-based anonymous sharing model, and subse-
quently (after we concluded our research) shut down.
We present our results organized around five key themes.
First, we present participants’ motivations and general prac-
tices in using these services. Second, we illustrate how iden-
tity management does play a role, even within these anony-
mous, no-persistent-identity applications. Third, we discuss
participants’ widely used de-anonymization activities where
they attempted to expose the identity of others on these ser-
vices. Fourth, we show how the services provided some de-
gree of intimacy and social support. In a fifth theme we con-
sider the negativity and bullying aspects of these services. In
addition to these themes, we consider the much-reduced use
of the services after a period of six to seven months and the
2https://www.wumii.org/
reasons for the usage drop-off. Finally, the discussion sec-
tion addresses a key goal of this work: providing an overview
of the opportunities and challenges of tie-based applications
exposed by this research, to inform the design of future plat-
forms and services that support this model.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The HCI community has long been interested in anonymous
platforms and services, and how identity practices affect com-
munity and social dynamics. In particular, we discuss var-
ious types or models of anonymity that were studied in the
field, including persistent identity systems, anonymity in ad-
hoc discussion threads and mixed anonymity models. Before
we expand on the specific types of anonymity, we briefly re-
view literature on self-disclosure.
Self-disclosure in social network environments can be seen
as driven by an extended functional process [10] that takes
into account audience perceptions and identity representa-
tion, balancing benefits and risks. People try to maximize
the rewards brought by self-disclosure (e.g., social valida-
tion and self-expression) [9, 14] and minimize the risks (e.g.,
concerns about sensitive information shared with third par-
ties) [10, 16]. Under the condition of anonymity, people have
been found to disclose personal information more freely, po-
tentially because they feel less constrained by the expecta-
tions of others or perceive less associated risks of social sanc-
tion [3, 25]. Anonymity also allows people to share sensitive
intimate narratives, and seek and provide support in stigma-
tized contexts such as sexual abuse or mental illness [1,2], and
explore aspects of their identity that otherwise would have
been impossible [12, 56]. Most recently, an interview study
of adolescents who use Ask.fm—a platform that allows se-
lective anonymity—found that by strategically using selective
anonymity, young people can build from social processes and
work towards key developmental goals [18]. Particularly, this
study argues that selective anonymity allows for higher lev-
els of perceived authenticity, bypassing social expectations,
learning about one’s self, managing identity, and initiating
and growing relationships [18].
On the other hand, the lack of attribution and responsibil-
ity associated with anonymity can also encourage malicious
behaviors such as trolling, hostile commenting [33], decep-
tion [24], and cyberbullying [5, 6, 34]. Research suggests, for
example, that lack of eye contact is a contributing factor to
disinhibition and one of the reasons for online negativity [33],
where other research points out that positive attitudes towards
cyber-bullying increase later tendencies of this behavior in
anonymous fora [6].
Next, we briefly report on the different models of anonymous
platforms and services that have been studied in HCI, includ-
ing recent research on relation-based anonymous platforms.
Models and Dynamics of Anonymous Services
One model of anonymity is persistent identity systems—
services in which the identity of the poster may be unknown
to others but still consistent from one post to another. This in-
cludes network-based systems like Twitter, where the posters
can choose whether to use their “real name” or not, as well as
topic-based systems (e.g., online forums, discussion groups,
etc.) where participants have a persistent identity that may be
pseudonymous. Previous studies on topic-based anonymous
platforms for example, looked into how identity design im-
pact communication dynamics on the platform [17]. Research
has also addressed social support, most often through topic-
based anonymous forums, from early studies of interaction
practices on forums [47] to more recent studies of limitations
to online medical support [26, 59]. Many of these studies il-
lustrate that the anonymity within these forums affords more
self-disclosure and emotional support [27]. At the same time,
the posting dynamics there express higher accountability and
somewhat more risk than the more ephemeral anonymity ser-
vices.
Most systems with non-persistent identities are content-
based, for example 4chan, Reddit and others. As one 4chan
study showed [11], 90% of the posts made in the network are
anonymous and cannot be linked to other submissions by the
same individual. Such submissions arguably allow individu-
als to express themselves more freely, but result in increased
negativity or need for moderation [32]. A significant issue in
anonymous systems with non-persistent identities is the issue
of source evaluation and credibility; in 4chan, the /b/ commu-
nity uses shared context expressed in language and images
that helps established credibility [11]. Trammell goes further
to argue that the validation and approval practices on 4chan
make it equivalent in some ways to a persistent user identity
community [55].
A few recent examples mixed anonymity models by bridg-
ing persistent- and ephemeral-identity platforms. Recent re-
search points out how “throwaway accounts” on otherwise
single-identity pseudonymous social media forums enable
users to switch identity temporarily [35] to be able to dis-
close particular information without repercussion. For in-
stance, Andalibi et al. discuss the nuances of anonymity and
suggest that sexual abuse survivors are more likely to use the
anonymity afforded by throwaway accounts to disclose their
experiences and seek support, and men are more likely to do
so due to more stigma in the context of abuse [1]. Another
recent study [12] looked at the support seeking and response
behavior in a mixed anonymous/real-name forum: Facebook
confessions boards. On these systems, people post anony-
mously (via a mediator) but receive replies by identifiable
Facebook users. This dynamic lead to little negativity and
an appropriate forum for discussing taboo topics and stigma-
tized identities [12].
As services that support a relation-based anonymity model
are quite new, only recently research had started examining
these platforms. Kang et al. conducted a qualitative study of
users of these new services and emphasized how important it
was for their participants to get social validation even from
anonymous strangers, echoing early research on Usenet [29].
However, only four of their eighteen participants were Secret
users, and the remaining were Whisper and Yik Yak users,
services that rely on a proximity relation rather then a set
of existing social connections (i.e., being connected through
other social networks) [29]. Other recent studies have quan-
titatively examined data from the proximity-based anonymity
service Whisper: One study compared Whisper’s and Twit-
ter’s different anonymity models and found that users use
anonymity to express their wants, needs, and wishes [15].
Another empirical study using 24 million posts on Whisper
looked into structures of user interaction, user engagement,
and network stickiness [58].
To summarize, in this paper we investigate tie-based
anonymity services, where the perceived affordances, bene-
fits and risks of participation are different than those of more
traditional social media services, including anonymous ones.
TIE-BASED ANONYMOUS SOCIAL APPS
The tie-based anonymous social applications have several
characteristics that set them apart from previous anonymous
chat rooms and forums. Where traditional online forums and
chat rooms are most often topic-based and support forum-
wide identity, ephemeral identity systems make use of some
sort of relationship between poster and reader, such as prox-
imity or existing digital social ties. In this work we focus
on the unique category of tie-based anonymous applications,
where the anonymous application uses data from another so-
cial network where social ties are articulated, for example
Facebook, or the phone’s address book. With this social net-
work information available to the application, it can mark
content as posted by “friend” or “friend of friend”—based on
a match done by the application but not exposed to the user.
Secret, available from December 2013 to April 2015, was
a mobile application that allowed users to share informa-
tion anonymously with Facebook friends and friends listed
in the user’s telephone contacts. Based on the friends list,
the app displayed a stream of posts shared by the user’s
friends, friends of friends, as well as popular posts by non-
friends. Users would see a list of reverse chronologically or-
dered posts that include text on top of a solid background
or attached picture, with the source identified as “friend” or
“friend of friend” when appropriate. In addition to these
posts, users could also view popular posts using the “Explore”
tab on the application, providing a list of popular and nearby
posts by non-friends.
In this version of Secret, users could “like” any post by click-
ing on the heart-shaped button but only comment on posts
from their friends or friends of friends. Comments were
anonymous as well, and commenting users were assigned a
colored icon consistent within the context of a single post.
As a result, there was no built-in mechanism to identify posts
or comments made by the same user beyond a single post and
discussion thread.
The Secret app changed functionality and look during its life-
time and our study. In December 2014, the app transitioned
from tie-based to proximity-based model. Like the popular
app Yik Yak, Secret showed anonymous posts from people
nearby, rather than from friends. In April 2015, shortly after
our last follow-up interview, Secret had shut down.
A Chinese app called Mimi (“secret” in Chinese) was
launched in late March 2014. The Mimi app is very similar to
the earlier version of Secret, to the point of being considered
a clone. Despite this similarity, Mimi did include additional
functions such as private messaging, allowing users to send
direct messages to the original author of a post. At the time
of writing, Mimi is still available and active under the name
Wumii. It is important to note that we included Mimi in the
study to increase the generalizability of our findings, rather
than to explicitly study cultural differences.
METHOD
Our study was based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews
with users of Secret and Mimi, conducted in August and
September 2014, with follow-up interviews six to seven
months later. Our aim was to investigate uses and practices
around the applications, as well as attitudes towards content
and anonymity in these new tie-based platforms. We asked
questions about participants’ current experiences within and
around these applications, with the goal of documenting ex-
amples of posts and reactions to these posts. We asked about
types of content and types of interactions taking place as
well as how they thought anonymity affected their interac-
tions on the platform. Seven months after the first round of
interviews, we followed up with a subset of participants via
short interviews or email correspondence (we approached all
but only a subset responded). By then, Secret had changed
the posting mechanism to focus on showing nearby posts
(“proximity-based”). The second-round interviews focused
on the changes to the participants’ practices through the past
seven months, in particular given the changes to the app in
the case of Secret.
Participants
We interviewed 15 participants: six users of the Chinese app
Mimi (three men, three women) and nine users (six men,
three women) of the US-based app Secret. Participants’ ages
ranged from 21 to 27 for Mimi, and 22 to 37 for Secret. Par-
ticipants held a diverse set of jobs, from pre-school teacher
and digital manager to advertisement agent and public rela-
tions. The Chinese participants all lived in China and Secret
users were located in the US. To recruit the participants, we
posted fliers at coffee shops in a major American metropoli-
tan area, performed snowball sampling through social net-
working sites, and approached users who posted about these
apps on Twitter and the Chinese-language weChat (through
direct messaging and forwarding recruiting messages). The
interviews with the Chinese participants were conducted with
a Chinese interviewer (one of the authors, a native Chinese
speaker) in Chinese and were translated to English by the
same person. Participants had to have used the applications
for at least two weeks at the time of the interview; most had
used it for several months when we conducted the first round
of interviews. The first round of interviews lasted 30–60 min-
utes. The participants were compensated $20 for their time.
All interviews were conducted over the phone due to geo-
graphical distance.
When approaching the participants again seven months later,
we were able to conduct follow-up interviews with five of
the Secret users, and received five written responses from the
Mimi users. For the remaining four Secret users, three did
not respond and one declined to be interviewed again. The
second round interviews with Secret users lasted 10–40 min-
utes depending on if they still used the application or not;
from the participants who responded, only one was still us-
ing the application, four were not, but all reported using the
app for months after the first interview. As the Mimi app did
not change as significantly, we limited the interaction with
the Mimi participants to an email inquiry where we asked if
and how they were still using the application. In Mimi’s case,
two participants were still using the application, but four were
not, citing that they have used it for a number of months after
the first round of interviews.
The recruitment process and study protocol were reviewed
and approved for the inclusion of human subjects by an Aca-
demic Institutional Review Board (Protocol #1406004763).
All the names of our participants were anonymized for anal-
ysis. In the results we identify quotes with a code indicating
the app used, gender and age of the participant. For example,
SF36 is a Secret user, female, who was 36 years old.
Analysis
The analysis of the data was conducted through qualitative
categorization and thematic analysis. After the interviews
were transcribed and translated into English (when needed),
one researcher independently coded all interviews for major
categories. Then a second researcher conducted more de-
tailed analysis using sub-categorization and constant compar-
ison [53]. Based on our research questions, we then high-
lighted relevant mentions in the transcripts, and grouped these
categories into major sub-categories iteratively. Comparing
the original categories and the sub-categories to each research
question, we determined the most important findings that we
elaborate on in the following sections. The follow-up inter-
views were coded and analyzed later but in close connection
to the corresponding original interview.
Due to the similarities in terms of functionality of the Chinese
app Mimi and the majorly US-based app Secret, we analyzed
the two sets of interviews collectively. Our interest was not
in cultural differences per se, but rather to sample across two
cultures. We closely watched out for potential cultural differ-
ences emerging from the interviews. In the end, we only ob-
served minor differences. We therefore continue to describe
our findings collectively, and only point out the few subtle
cultural differences in the later part of the paper.
RESULTS
We now discuss the results from the first set of interviews.
After briefly describing the general motivations and uses of
the two services, we explore five themes: Motivations and
general uses; the need for identity management in this type of
anonymous social media; the de-anonymization that in fact
took place; how the app fostered intimacy, support and en-
couragement; and finally, how users dealt with conflicts in-
side the app.
Motivations and Uses
This first set of findings echos and enforces the findings of
Kang et al.’s investigation of relation-based anonymity apps,
which focused on location-based platform but included some
users of a tie-based platform (Secret) [29]. We report on these
findings briefly below, to focus on angles and findings specific
to tie-based platforms which were not highlighted in earlier
research.
One major motivating factor participants cited for using the
apps was entertainment: five participants mentioned check-
ing the app when bored as a kind of distraction and mostly
glanced over it for locating humorous and funny posts. One
user reported that “it’s sort of my morning routine. I wake
up and check my phone; I look at my email, check Twitter,
and then I’d go to Secret” [SM24]. Despite the very different
model for anonymity, interviewees sometimes described their
motivations in relation to other anonymous social media such
as Reddit. One participant talked about Reddit being “com-
pletely different” in terms of the motivation for using the plat-
form: “Secret. . . connects you with friends, and it’s more per-
sonalized type of secrets that people are uploading” [SF36].
A key motivation was illustrated through participants describ-
ing the platform as a place where people can “let it out” with-
out having their names attached. “It allows and enables you
just say that stuff that’s on your mind. It may not make every-
one happy” [SM27] or “things that I would like to tweet, but I
don’t want my name attached to it because people might have
judgments about that” [SM24]. One interviewee specifically
mentioned anonymous apps as a platform for self-disclosure
that avoids social sanction: “I think everyone has the desire
to self-disclose. They want to express the most indecent side
of themselves, things that your society doesn’t recognize or
value [. . . ] Indicating that you are good at sex is a posi-
tive image for you; but you cannot say, I am asexual (on so-
cial media) [. . . ] These things can only be posted on anony-
mous communities” [MM21]. Other participants reported be-
ing able to post untrue content. When asked the reason be-
hind that, one participant responded: “to see what would hap-
pen. . . and what kind of responses I would get, or what kind of
comments or what kind of reaction I could elicit” [SF36]. The
curiosity of the reactions to extreme posts sometimes trumped
the social norm of posting “real” secrets and made this type
of social probing fairly common.
Several of the participants indicated that posting to these apps
allowed them to avoid complications from their friends while
still gaining the benefits from social interaction and valida-
tion. One participant reported posting a secret that received
around ten likes: “I met my ex boyfriend a few days ago. I
got an email from him just now. I deleted it, without read-
ing” [MF24]. One of the reasons she did not post a particu-
lar post on her real-name social networks was that she only
wanted to post to release her feelings but did not want any-
one to know it was her. Posting under real-name would have
led to her friends asking what happened and to “overthink”.
These statements illustrate previous findings on the benefits
of self-disclosure [16, 45] and earlier findings in the study of
Kang et al. [29]. We return to this theme in the discussion.
Motivations for recurring use grew together with the size
of the participant’s Secret network. Some participants com-
mented on how the size of their network determined the visi-
bility and readership of posts, and hence significantly affected
their experience on the platform (and the motivation for us-
ing the app). As one participant put it, “If you don’t have a
lot of friends, your post is only getting read by however many
people in that circle. . . ” [SF36]. The enjoyment of consump-
tion was also limited with a smaller network, for example:
“[In the beginning] I would go on maybe once a week just
because there wasn’t very many updated posts for me to see,
so there wasn’t much action happening” [SM24]. While the
value of the network grew with the size of it, it was not simple
to “recruit” friends to use the app, precisely due to the app’s
anonymous nature, but participants still reported occasionally
asking their friends if they were using the app or not.
Identity Management
Six of the participants explicitly stated that the reduced need
for identity management was something that made the appli-
cation in question different. One person for example reported
that “on social networks where people know your identity,
[. . . ] you will have a drive to construct your self-image, and
intentionally post things that are beneficial [. . . ], that adds to
your high-end image construction” [MM21]. Other partici-
pants differentiated the identity aspects of Secret from other
anonymous services: “on [other anonymous social media],
you have an identity on the entire site, or multiple identities if
you’re logging in with multiple accounts. But no matter what
you do [there], no matter what the thread is, it’s the same
identity” [SF22]. Participants reported that the ephemeral
identity on the Secret app helped them to not be concerned
about identity management since there was no pressure to
live up to their “real self” as represented on other social me-
dia. This freedom did not necessarily mean that the users pre-
sented a false image. SF24, for example, explained how she
felt she was representing her true self on Secret: “I think I’ve
never pretended to [. . . ] be anything that I wasn’t or anyone
that I wasn’t, and I feel like I guess I’m the most myself on
Secret”.
Interestingly, identity considerations still applied in some
cases as participants used the text of the post to hint at, or
further obscure, their identity. Interviewees reported crafting
their posts carefully, based on their desired audiences: some-
times explicitly targeting their friends or expecting friends to
be able to identify them, and at other times making sure to
avoid identification by friends. One participant for example
explained “when I’m feeling depressed [. . . ] I don’t want
people to know who I am, so I intentionally hide my speech
habits. For [other types] I don’t really care so I don’t change
anything in particular” [MF22]. In doing that, these partici-
pants took full advantage of the non-persistent nature of iden-
tities where different posts cannot be associated with the same
author: “If you present yourself as the same in your daily
life, like funny or hilarious, [. . . ] it’s very easy for friends to
guess who this is; but if you post something that no one knows
about, they couldn’t guess who that is, even if you post a lot
of secrets” [MF24]. In summary, participants were articulate
about identity management still being important to a certain
degree, perhaps because they were aware of the possible pro-
cess of de-anonymization, a practice we discuss next.
De-Anonymization
We identified two types of “identity hacking” that participants
were aware of. We name them “hard-hacking” (i.e., using
technical approaches) and “soft-hacking” (de-anonymization
via social engineering and manual procedures). Most partic-
ipants had no concern for hard-hacking, saying for example:
“I’ve read their articles about how they sort of anonymize
things, and so I feel very comfortable with sort of the tech-
nical aspects behind things, and how they set up their sys-
tem” [SM24]. However, eight participants reported concerns
or at least an awareness of “soft hacking”, for example saying
that “some friends could easily figure things out by thinking
about it for more than half a second” [SM24].
Actual practices of soft-hacking by participants were preva-
lent as well. Seven of the participants expressed how it was
“half the fun” or even a game to figure out who was the poster
of an item. They used guessing, their knowledge of their
friends, or language and speech cues to do so. A participant
said he “knew exactly who it was because six months prior. . . ,
my friend said the exact same quote to me. . . ” [SM24]. Par-
ticipants also practiced de-anonymization, with fairly sophis-
ticated practical methods. Participants reported, for example:
(1) trying to figure out who in their contact list was using the
app; (2) sharing screenshots to others via text messaging or
other social media; (3) comparing (and triangulating) friend
lists with other friends who used the app. In contrast, sev-
eral participants were not motivated, saying that “while it’s
not very difficult to identify who posted the secret, no one has
the extra time to actually do this, and nobody would believe
it anyway” [MM21]. When asked if there were any differ-
ences between a post from a “friend” or a “friend of a friend”,
MF24 responded:“Of course, I definitely care more about my
friends’ posts [. . . ] If it’s something shocking from a friend, I
am definitely interested in figuring out who that was.”
Intimacy, Support and Encouragement
As noted above, participants certainly observed and reported
posting more intimate content, due to the disinhibition effect
of anonymous platforms [54]. Moreover, participants under-
stood (and often reported witnessing) the benefits of such dis-
closures. One participant for example commented: “Those
things that people are too shy to discuss in real life but truly
want to know more about, not involving attacking others, are
actually beneficial” [MF23]. Others said that they would not
share the posted content with friends in person if they were
worried about being judged. Relatedly, one user described the
anonymous sharing as “almost like gossiping without the neg-
ative effects of it landing specifically on someone. . . ” [SF36].
Ten of the participants described finding encouragement and
validation for the sentiment shared on Secret or Mimi, for
themselves or for others. One participant for example re-
ported that she posted on Secret about being afraid to go to
the gynecologist because of a past sexual assault, something
she could not talk openly about. She received several com-
ments and said: “I think most of them were friends, and they
said something encouraging along the lines of ‘it’s important
for your health, and I’m really sorry that that all happened.
We’re here for you if you reach out to somebody to go with
you.’ Just trying to help, ease my fear, more or less.” She
also received more likes than comments, and attributed that
to “they don’t really know what to say, but they’re just trying
to show support or affirmation of some kind” [SF24].
A more subtle benefit of the tie-based anonymity was a bet-
ter understanding of attitudes and opinions among one’s so-
cial ties, or at least a perception of such understanding. In
eight of the interviews, participants reported that they were
able to gain a better understanding of their collective group
of friends, which in effect influenced their face-to-face social
behavior. One participant told us how he had no idea that
some of his friends were in fact questioning their sexual ori-
entation: “For example, [. . . ] I had no idea that some people
in my friend network questioned their sexual orientation. And
they’re afraid to talk about it in person, but they’re okay with
talking about it in sort of this anonymous aspect. [. . . ] so
I think it’s great for me to understand my group of friends
better as a whole and maybe next time when I’m in a social
gathering, I won’t make any comments about people’s sexual
orientation or anything like that. Big [. . . ] friendship strat-
egy decisions on my end” [SM24].
Sometimes, the experienced benefit was to learn about an
agreement with others within the anonymous tie-based net-
work. Some very popular posts had a shared sentiment of
surprising recognition, for example as described by one par-
ticipant: “[. . . ] you can find someone who says some random
things, and you’ll realize [. . . ] (s)he feels the same or is also
like this! This is very interesting and very unique” [MM27].
Another participant reported that one of his posts got three
thousand likes and four hundred comments in a few days, say-
ing it really must have “struck a chord” [SM27]; he reported
receiving comments like “yep, I do the same thing.”
People reported being motivated to explicitly provide support.
One participant for example said that “if it can help others,
giving one or two sentences and be the audience of that per-
son’s thoughts wouldn’t be a bad thing. After all, they are
friends, or your friends of friends. If someone has problems,
it’s nice if you can comfort or cheer them up a bit” [MM27].
On the other hand, this knowledge of ties, even remote, can
make negative comments even more hurtful. One user re-
ported stopping posting secrets after receiving very negative
responses from several of her quite emotional posts, a topic
we now turn to.
Debates, Conflicts and Bullying
As may be expected, postings and comments on these ser-
vices often lead to debate and conflict. Participants reported
that highly contentious topics could lead to non-supportive
and judging comments: “[. . . ] these battles [can be really]
drawn out and obnoxious to a certain point because both of
them are just on such extremes that no one was really hav-
ing a really worthwhile debate” [SM27]. Another participant
described: “When there are two different opinions on certain
things, and some people are just not very tactful in the way
they say things. So if somebody posts something about being
cheated on, then there will be commenters who will come in
and say, ‘oh you always deserve a second chance’, and some
others would say ‘no, once a cheater, always a cheater’. And
then some of the commenters will fight back and forth about
their opinions.”
Although participants did not admit to bullying or directly
contributing to conflicts, as expected with a fairly self-
selected set of participants, some confessed commenting in an
impulsive way, saying things they did not really mean. One
participant explicitly admitted commenting un-constructively
when he was not in a good mood. Overall, though, partici-
pants often claimed that they defended attacked posters from
their attackers, and that they reported or called out offenders
when inappropriate content was posted.
Participants were exposed to and well aware of negativity
in these apps, and were often unsurprised when it occurred,
recognizing the anonymity dynamics. “Whenever you don’t
have to be held accountable, I think, unfortunately that there
are other people who will use that to hurt people. [. . . ]
You tend to lean towards doing something that you proba-
bly wouldn’t if you could be held accountable” [SM37]. This
behavior is often referred to as “trolling” behavior, such as
degrading and objectionable comments in response to others’
content. Participants were all well aware of trolling on these
services, with thirteen of them mentioning the negative char-
acteristics of some of the posts. One participant for exam-
ple told us about comments that “say really nasty, negative
things” [SF36]. Another participant specifically mentioned
threads bashing an identified person on Secret: “It’s like a
train wreck. . . it’s a disaster when you look because you just
can’t believe that people are this terrible” [SF22]. Partici-
pants reported flagging and reporting posts and comments, as
well as calling out people within the social network.
Finally, the negativity on the platforms can lead to decreased
engagement and disclosure through the platform. Accord-
ing to one participant, “Most of the times there were rumors,
scandals, made up stories and especially this abusing others
or something like that. We say in Chinese ‘negative energy’.
It makes people frustrated and disappointed sometimes. [. . . ]
So yes after one or two uncomfortable experience I chose not
to post on Mimi” [MF21].
Revisiting: Persistence of Use and Changes in App Func-
tionality
As we mentioned earlier, we contacted participants for a sec-
ond interview during a period between six to seven months
after the first interview. We were primarily interested in
changes to the the participants’ practices during the past
months, particularly in respect to the changes in the applica-
tions. This allowed us to get a longer term perspective of use
of tie-based anonymous applications. Between the first and
the second interview, the Secret app had gone through sig-
nificant changes: it transformed into a primarily proximity-
based app (much like Yik Yak). Mimi, on the other hand,
kept the original tie-based concept, but had added a few new
features, such as eliminating the option to see if a post came
from friends or friends of friends.
For the second round of interviews, all of the Secret par-
ticipants reported a radical change of content over the last
months where bullying and name calling had become promi-
nent alongside adult content, reinforcing the findings of Kang
et al. [29] with longitudinal evidence. One participant mused
that it was “a sad commentary about humanity that as soon
as we get to be anonymous we abuse it” [SM37]. Participants
reported increased abusive and bullying behavior on the app,
and one recalled a heated conflict within her own circle of
friends that had taken place between the two interviews. Sev-
eral participants reported incidents involving posters identify-
ing others within the posts. Only one of the five participants
we talked to was still using Secret; the other four particu-
larly reported the reason for having left to be the negative and
bullying postings. One participant described how she kept
seeing her friends post unpleasant content, starting to specifi-
cally name others and how, even if she called them out on it,
they continued. She said she gradually stopped using Secret
until one day she just simply deleted the application from her
phone.
Two of the participants mentioned they were initially en-
thusiastic to have the app change its feed logic to not only
proximity-based but also letting them peek at other cities. A
participant who were still using the app, for example said “I
like that there is more on the app, there weren’t much, [I] got
bored before. Now it is much better and allows us to chat
directly, it makes it a lot more interesting. I just think the en-
tire concept behind Secret. . . now I can see what people are
thinking” [SF36]. She felt that the New York and the San
Francisco feed were more interesting than her local Miami
feed, which seemed a bit “childish.”
One of the main changes in the Mimi app was that the app
no longer showed explicitly whether posters were friends, or
just friends of friends, thus making de-identification more
difficult. All but two of our six participants reported hav-
ing given up using the app with different reasons: Two felt
the application did not provide enough content and entertain-
ment. Two others tied their disengagement to the anonymity
change: not being able to distinguish between friends and
friends of friends, the de-anonymization was limited and the
app was not as fun.
DISCUSSION
Before our discussion, we note a few cultural differences
in relation to tie-based anonymity systems—differences that
were not readily apparent from our study. As an investiga-
tion into this topic, we included Chinese and US participants
in order to be comprehensive rather than to be comparative.
Indeed, we analyzed the data with an eye for differences in
how the themes were expressed by participants of different
cultures but no such differences emerged. Of course, the fact
that the Mimi app is still active, versus the disappearance (and
preceding adaptation) of Secret from the US market, may by
itself suggest cultural differences, but these are a matter of
another, more targeted investigation.
We now turn to our discussion where we highlight oppor-
tunities and challenges for tie-based anonymity applications.
We use these opportunities and challenges to motivate several
ideas and implications for future tie-based anonymity plat-
forms. We acknowledge that some of the opportunities we
identified can also be problematic depending on the specific
implementation, and that finding ways to design for the trade-
offs between the benefits and risks of tie-based anonymity is
a fruitful area for future work.
Opportunity: Self-disclosure
Based on our findings, we believe the self-disclosure opportu-
nities with tie-based anonymity goes beyond what is afforded
by other anonymous services, particularly due to the connec-
tion with friends.
As recognized by past research on self-disclosure, the dis-
closure itself may provide significant benefits [16, 45]. As
is also known, under the condition of anonymity, users tend
to disclose more, a phenomena known as the disinhibition
effect [54], which we also identified in our participants’ re-
marks. Furthermore, our interviews suggest that free from
identification concerns, participants perceive less associated
risks of social sanction or issues of self-representation, simi-
lar to earlier findings [3, 25]. As is the case for other anony-
mous systems [12, 29], tie-based systems thus allow greater
self-disclosure than other social applications, as well as pro-
vide grounds for self-expression and relief.
The core value, we believe, lies in the potential reward for
self-disclosure in tie-based applications, which is potentially
more substantial than in other anonymous applications. Self-
disclosure is a function of both risk and reward [10, 41]
where rewards may include, for example, social validation
and self-expression [14]. As mentioned above, the opportu-
nity for self-disclosure in tie-based anonymity applications
is strengthened through the reduced risks of being identified.
Importantly, it is also strengthened through the heightened
reward (compared to other anonymous platforms) given that
the post is likely to be seen by a subset of one’s social ties;
despite trends of negativity and mean behavior, participants
reported being able to receive support and encouragement
based on their disclosure. In other words, while anonymity
in general allows people to explore aspects of their identity
that otherwise would have been impossible [40,56], tie-based
systems allow one to do that in the context of their social ties.
Or, in Goffman’s terms [22], tie-based anonymity may allow
backstage-like performance in a front stage-like context.
Opportunity: Extending Social Behavior
Beyond self-disclosure, our findings highlight an opportunity
for extending social behavior through tie-based anonymity
services, providing social affordances that go beyond iden-
tifiable media and other types of anonymous systems. It
was clear from our participants that they, or others on these
tie-based services, were engaging in social behavior and ex-
tracted social insights about their social ties in a way that is
not readily attainable from other services or classic social net-
works.
First, the opportunity to perform social probing, with little
risk, and in the context of friends, is a powerful and unique
affordance of tie-based anonymous services. Our findings
suggest that users can go beyond self-disclosure to post mes-
sages, whether true or false, that are intended to elicit re-
actions or “test the waters” with their group of social ties.
This opportunity is available in anonymized settings, where
an individual is not at risk by posting the information, and
by replying to it with honest attitudes. Furthermore, only in
tie-based anonymized settings people can post such message
to get feedback from and exposure to friends and social ties.
Prior work on identity transition has similarly found a need
for people to be able to test out aspects of their identities that
they may feel vulnerable about in online spaces [23]. In doing
such posting, it may fill a social probing role similar to one
of humor [19]; relatedly, tie-based applications allow radical
ideas to be tested in social settings. Even here, the expression
can take a slant that is sometimes playful and more tentative.
Second, and relatedly, is the opportunity for an individual
user of tie-based anonymous services to develop a better un-
derstanding of their group of friends and social ties using
information shared on the application, even without explicit
probing activities. Some participants in our study hinted at
a potential for a better window into their friends’ attitudes,
opinions, and perhaps even actions due to the properties of the
tie-based services, aligned with the fundamental human need
to belong [7]. Note that these impressions may or may not
be warranted (e.g., as only a minority of most participants’
friends were active on these services), and the understand-
ing may not even be accurate (e.g., as participants themselves
noted, information may be untrue). Nevertheless, the oppor-
tunity to be—or merely to feel—more informed about one’s
social ties is significant. We emphasize that this affordance
is unique to tie-based systems. Social information process-
ing theory [57] has long considered how people slowly de-
velop mutual impressions and understanding over computer-
mediated communication. Here, the learning is not about
a specific connection, and definitely not an identified one,
but rather about a set of social ties. A critical difference
from other types of anonymous groups is the tie-based setup,
where each individual is connected to their own social ties,
as opposed to the topic- and content-based, or location-based
anonymous groups or communities in other anonymity mod-
els.
Opportunity: Anonymity at Will
Finally, an opportunity that has yet to be widely utilized
within social networks is the new mechanism for “anonymity
at will”. We saw from our interviews the users’ ability to con-
struct their posts in relation to who would be reading them,
thus providing the level of anonymity that they wanted each
post to have. Sometimes they were able to be completely
anonymous, but they felt they could craft posts to signal iden-
tity to some subset of readers or all. Ellison et al. suggest that
particularly for adolescents, being able to selectively engage
in anonymous interactions with a group of known peers has,
key implications for identity and social development [18].
Social steganography [39] refers to a practice of hiding se-
cret messages in plain sight, where unwanted parties are not
aware of their existence, or are unable to penetrate their actual
meaning. This sharing practice is not uncommon in other so-
cial media, where for example location is revealed but only to
the level of detail that an inside circle of friends would under-
stand [4, 36], or posts are “coded” through culturally specific
references, inside jokes and other linguistic tools [13].
In a slightly different way, tie-based anonymity services cre-
ate new avenues for people to transmit sensitive messages
to friends: here the content is exposed but the identity of
the poster may be only known to some specific target set of
individuals through the crafting of the message. We term
this practice “identity steganography”. As such, any new
avenue for communication could serve an important social
role [13]. For example, users can use identity steganography
to seek social support while preserving privacy, especially in
tie-based anonymity as friends who have the relevant context
may know the identity of the original poster and reach out
privately.
We discussed opportunities and potential benefits, but of
course, there are darker sides to tie-based anonymity. Next,
we discuss some of the key challenges.
Challenge: Negativity and Bullying
As is the case in other anonymous platforms, negativity and
bullying are a significant challenge. Throughout the life of
anonymous or pseudo-anonymous networks (i.e., site-wide
user names, nick-name based networks), “trolling” can signif-
icantly curb participation and constructive contributions [33,
34]. Participants in our study also described widespread neg-
ativity, getting even worse later on in the lifetime of the Secret
application. This negativity increase could potentially be due
to the fact that anonymity accentuate the interchangeability
of group members, making trolling behavior “catch on” and
converge to become the social norm [46]. While our results
do not explicitly hint at that, there is a further risk of par-
ticular forms of abuse when the negativity is expressed by a
friend, from the comfort of their anonymity cover. As shown
in our findings and by Kang et al. [29], this negative behavior
is likely the reason for a decline of the use of these applica-
tions over time.
While participants reported “flagging” certain posts and oth-
erwise trying to prevent abuse in the platform, this issue re-
mains a challenge for services that would require significant
resources to address. A sliver of hope lies in the fact that
in mobile-based applications (which relation- and tie-based
anonymity services tend to be), a robust user identifier is
available to the service (i.e., an identifier of the mobile de-
vice used to access the app) and it is hard for users to create a
new access avenue. This feature makes banning users, at least
theoretically, more plausible than for other anonymous ser-
vices, for example on the Web. However, given the amount of
potential interactions, moderating, flagging and banning con-
tent is likely to remain a challenge for any popular tie-based
anonymity platform.
Challenge: Rumors and Gossip
Beyond negativity, the lack of accountability also transforms
tie-based anonymous services into places where rumor and
gossip can be spread easily. Through our interviews we also
uncovered a general perception by our participants that the
two secret apps were rife with rumors and gossip. It has been
long argued that gossip has a social function [21, 42]; gossip
provides ways of making sense to help us cope with uncer-
tainty and anxiety [49, 50], and can serve to convey informa-
tion about the society and culture [8, 60]. Interestingly, “gos-
sip tends to have an ‘inner-circleness’ about it, in that it is
customarily passed between people who have a common his-
tory or shared interests” [51], aligning gossip outcomes well
with tie-based anonymous applications.
On the other hand, social psychology defines rumors as “a
statement whose truth-value is unverifiable or deliberately
false” [48]. Rumors thrive in secret environments, and often
has significant negative outcomes [50]. The challenge of con-
trolling the spread of rumors on social media platforms has
been substantial. Even with real-name or persistent identity
on social media, where one can verify or identify the source
of information, rumor practices is an open issue and an active
research area [48]. In tie-based anonymous applications, this
evaluation is much harder or impossible. Even worse, indi-
viduals run little risk in spreading rumors on these platforms.
Participants felt that to be engaging, the content needed to
be believable but as we pointed out above, the tie-based ser-
vices often offered content that was “too fake or too real”.
The uncertainly, and inability to evaluate content, could be a
challenge for adoption and continued use.
Adding to the challenge is the fact that due to the unverifi-
able nature of rumors, hurtful rumors and gossiping may be
harder to moderate than negativity and bullying, which are
more often immediately identifiable.
Challenge: Critical Mass
One challenge for any social media application is critical
mass and adoption [38]. Many social media services rely
on known ties and existing social networks for diffusion,
for example via mechanisms to invite friends to join. To
have enough compelling content from one’s friend, tie-based
anonymity services also need to reach scale in adoption. This
presents a significant challenge for these systems, as they can-
not rely on traditional diffusion techniques: an individual can-
not reveal their own identity to invite people to join the ser-
vice. Of course, due to the anonymity and lack of persistent
identity, one cannot create ties directly on these platforms ei-
ther, as one would for example on Facebook or Twitter. As
a result, tie-based anonymous platforms could find it hard to
grow the network, and hence limit the available tie-based con-
tent and audience for any single user. This challenge had di-
rect impact on the participants in our study, whom could not
get enough content to keep them entertained and engaged in
the apps. While proximity-based anonymous services could
simply expand content by extending the radius of relevant
posts, in tie-based services it is unclear whether the context
(i.e., social radius) can be extended meaningfully (one might
not care to read updates from a friend-of-friend-of-friend).
All in all, without the ability to directly invite one’s friends
or create new ties on a tie-based anonymity service, the avail-
ability of content on the platform would be quite sparse.
Design Implications
We provide several design implications and considerations
for providing tie-based anonymity services. Importantly,
some of these suggestions are not for stand-alone tie-based
services, but instead argue for inclusion of similar features in
other social media platforms.
Anonymity flashes. One way to allow for the benefits listed
above while perhaps circumventing some of the challenges
is to directly build tie-based anonymity features into the ex-
perience of identity-based social network services like Twit-
ter or Facebook. For example, Facebook could allow users
to post one anonymous post per day (an “anonymous flash”)
that would be broadcast—without attribution—to the user’s
network. Deep integration into such social network service
can allow comments and replies to the post to be identified
(for instance as described in [12]) or similarly anonymous,
each option provides different benefits.
Guessing game. Given the magnitude of de-anonymization
attempts, tie-based services or functions may consider includ-
ing a formal mechanism where, via private messages, indi-
viduals can be queried and admit (or perhaps prove) that they
posted any specific content item (“Alice, is that you?” queries
Bob). In “pure” tie-based anonymity services even the fact
that individuals participate in the system is obscure, which
would make such mechanism difficult to implement. How-
ever, such mechanism would be easier to implement if the
tie-based system is integrated into a persistent identity plat-
form like Twitter or Facebook.
Minimize de-identification risks. To make it harder for
users to engage in “contact list hacking”, future applications
should make permanent the app content shown to the user,
and not dependent on the user’s current set of followees. In
other words, once a user sees a post, it always remains on
their list, preventing the option of hacking your contact list
by removing contacts one-by-one to figure out who made one
specific post.
Curbing negativity. Given that anonymity and loose so-
cial norms can quickly cause tie-based anonymity services
to degenerate into a hostile and negative environment, it is
critical to offer more comprehensive support to battling this
type of content. Immediate flagged content removal (delete-
then-verify) and other more proactive techniques may be a
better approach. One can perhaps consider that users post-
ing negative comments slowly lose their privileges (e.g., their
anonymity) on the service, essentially circumventing outright
banning but limiting the opportunity for negative postings by
any one user. Note that the main enablers of these tie-based
systems—the fact that they are tied to a specific ID, often a
mobile phone identifier, and even when it is not exposed in the
service—-should be useful for banning and restricting users,
compared to other anonymous services like news comment-
ing, or online forums.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we provided a qualitative in-depth examination
of user practices in tie-based anonymity services, and showed
why the affordances provided by these services form a new
model of anonymity in computer-mediated communication.
Such tie-based systems offer opportunities for self-disclosure
that are not available in “real-name” networks or persistent-
identity anonymous networks. Furthermore, these services
can provide an environment where people can test the waters
with their friends, exploring attitudes and possible reactions
for complicated situations in their lives. We also highlighted
a set of challenges for tie-based anonymity systems. With-
out having to rule whether tie-based anonymity services have
any merit or potential for broad appeal and mass adoption
as stand-alone applications, we believe our design considera-
tions may be useful for providing the benefits of such services
in the future in various settings.
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